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"On September 11, America's contract with the Department of Defense 
was torn up and a new contract is being written." – DoD Transformation 
“Czar” Arthur K. Cebrowski 1 
Introduction 
Learning is often conceived as gaining insight from experience. Focusing events 
such as the September 11 terrorist attacks against the United States in 2001, generate 
widespread determination to seek such insight.  
On a Tuesday morning that America will not forget, operatives from the 
Afghanistan-based al-Qaeda network hijacked four commercial passenger aircraft. 
Armed with box-cutters, these villains did not intend to take hostages, but to use the 
planes as weapons. This was the impact of the deadliest terrorist attack in history 
(Council on Foreign Relations, 2002): two planes completely destroyed the twin towers 
of the World Trade Center in New York, one took out a portion of the Pentagon, and 
another crash- landed in Pennsylvania. More than three thousand were killed, most of 
them civilians. No volume of donated blood could save them. Civilian air traffic was shut 
down completely, so that by afternoon only US military aircraft occupied the skies. 
US President George W. Bush observed in the wake of the attacks:   
All of us in government are having to adjust our way of thinking about the 
new war. The military is going to have to adjust. They recognize…that we 
need to rethink how we configure our military …so that we more 
                                                 
The views expressed here are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Naval Postgraduate 
School or the United States Government. I owe thanks to the Homeland Security Program at the Naval 
Postgraduate School for making possible the presentation of this paper. 
1 Arthur K. Cebrowski, Director of DoD's Transformation Office, and a retired Navy vice admiral, 
quoted in Gerry J. Gilmore, "Change US Military Now, DoD Transformation Czar Urges," American 
Forces Press Service, http://www.army.mil/usar/news/2002/07july/ transformnow.html downloaded 
7/26/02. 
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effectively respond to asymmetrical responses from terrorist organizations. 
(Bush, October 11, 2002) 
In this paper, I focus on the lessons available to the US military for its new 
thinking, broadly defining military organizations to include the National Guard with the 
uniformed services. Customary roles and missions for these organizations became subject 
to renegotiation after 9/11. The military has been instructed to protect the homeland while 
waging war on terrorism abroad. There are two fronts in the war on terror and both of 
these are stability operations that make civil affairs of military concern. What insights 
from experience does the US military bring to its thinking about the new war? Did the 
September 11 attacks prompt a new approach to lesson seeking? 
Current challenges include operating in sensitive civilian environments, working 
with multiple civilian agencies and international partners, and managing low-intensity 
conflict environments. Logical referents for US military forces today are civil-military 
operations experiences in support of civil authority at home and in multilateral 
peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance missions abroad. However, the US military 
only reluctantly performed those chores. As if in order to emphasize that these are 
ancillary to the military's primary organizational purpose, these have fallen into the 
doctrinal rubric of Operations Other Than War (OOTW). The challenges of so-called 
‘non-traditional missions’ are profound enough that scholars of civil-military relations 
cite them as contributing conditions for military organizational change (Moskos et al., 
2000).  It is all the more noteworthy, then, to identify military utilization of insight from 
those experiences.  
In the first section of the paper, I pick up tools from the literature on 
organizational learning to construct propositions about military learning. The next section 
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turns specifically to the challenges to the military and its competencies for meeting them. 
Although the role of doctrine figures prominently in the literature on military change, the 
post-September 11 experience shows us that the military can -- in very short order -- 
make changes without new doctrine. It can take new approaches to operations, reconsider 
its definitions of theaters of operations, and establish new organizational structures, 
without new doctrine. Although I will argue that doctrine is not enough, it would be 
wrong to conclude that civil-military operations post-Sept. 11 lack a doctrinal driver. 
Rather, this analysis shows that the implementation of doctrine presents opportunities for 
understanding politics that many researchers have missed. 
Organizational Learning 
Learning is sometimes characterized as a remedial process, "a process of 
detecting and correcting error" (Argyris, 1977: 116). Certainly detecting and correcting 
error seems to characterize what many within the US government have been trying to do 
in the months since September 11. The forensics started shortly after the attacks, to 
determine how those charged with national security failed to anticipate and prevent them. 
'Whistle blowers' came forward at the FBI and elsewhere to identify flaws in US 
government operations. The intelligence community in particular came under scrutiny, 
because despite numerous clues that such an attack might occur, strategic analysis failed 
to 'connect the dots' (Zakaria, 2002).  
Discussion of how to apply lessons from experience to international politics is not 
new. Alexander George, Ole Holsti and others have shown how leaders use analogies in 
decision-making, but tend to interpret experiences in accordance with their views of the 
world or operational code. Those seeking to understand the behavior of militaries as they 
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prepare for and fight wars are understandably interested in the insights of organization 
theory (Farrell, 1996). The strategic studies literature has sought out organizational 
determinants of military change in general, and innovation in particular (Avant, 1994; 
Goldman, 1999; Legro, 1995; Rosen, 1991).  Military doctrine figures prominently into 
these discussions. Doctrine, for Kimberly Zisk is the site of military innovation (Zisk, 
1993). If doctrine indicates learning, the latest Army Operations has shown new 
consideration of civilian issues in its organizational routine. The Army now includes 
civilians in the METT-T factors fundamental to battle command assessment and 
visualization is a remarkable indication of learning: 
METT-TC refers to factors that are fundamental to assessing and 
visualizing: Mission, Enemy, Terrain and Weather, Troops and support 
available, Time available, and Civil considerations. The first five factors 
are not new. However, the nature of full spectrum operations requires 
commanders to assess the impact of nonmilitary factors on operations. 
Because of this added complexity, civil considerations [emphasis original] 
has been added to the familiar METT-T to form METT-TC. All 
commanders must use METT-TC to start their visualization. (FM 3-0:5-3) 
For Theo Farrell, doctrine is not enough, because doctrine plays different roles in 
different militaries, and because doctrinal change may not translate into organizational 
behavior. Farrell defines military change as adoption of new strategies, structures and 
goals, for example, adopting a new primary mission as in the US Marine Corps interwar 
shift from light infantry to amphibious warfare (in Farrell & Terriff, 2001, p. 4).  Civilian 
influence, change in enemy strategy and new technologies all potentially cause military 
change. An external shock, such as an unexpected defeat, can also trigger change. 
Learning implies something more than change. It implies taking note of the external 
shock as well as the past routines and orientations that enabled or inhibited coping with 
that event. 
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To say that organizations learn, that is, acquire knowledge or know-how, implies 
a package of assumptions. It assumes that there is learner, there is a process of learning 
and there is content to learning, or learning 'product' (Argyris and Schon, 1996). The 
organization as a subject of learning is well established, notwithstanding a couple of 
problems stemming from the collective nature of organizations. First, learning seems an 
individual phenomenon and yet we say that organizations learn. But we often do refer to 
collectivities like a team, a firm, an administration, and "the army" as competing, 
adopting strategies and in general performing cognitive functions like thinking, deciding 
and inter-relating. Organizations are systems in which individuals cooperate to perform 
tasks that arise repeatedly (Bernard, 1938). Organizations embody knowledge in 
structures and procedures so that members are able to perform within certain parameters. 
This relationship between the individual and organization is not insignificant in the 
learning process. For March (1991) organizational codes or shared beliefs are 
characterized by a dynamic of mutual learning. Individuals should not adjust to the code, 
March warns, until the code can learn from them. In these terms, the 'whistle blower' is 
noteworthy for at least two reasons: the 'whistle' sounds an alarm to widely recognizable 
failure; the 'blower' asserts individualism and refuses to adjust to the code. 
Second, because organizations are collective enterprises, they tend to emphasize 
conformity and resist change. And yet organizations do adapt over time (Cyert and 
March, 1963). The central concern in the literature is not whether but how; that is, what 
types of adaptive processes improve effectiveness? Learning is so strongly associated 
with organizational effectiveness that commercial organizations hire learning gurus for 
advice on becoming a "learning organization." The "consultancy school" tends to work 
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from case studies of organizations identified as "learning organizations" so that the "best 
practices" of these serve as models for other organizations (Denton: 1998, 41). 
Organization literature provides alternative criteria for identifying learning, 
articulates tasks necessary for learning, considers the role of events as triggers for 
learning, and differentiates types of learning. The discussion will consider these issues in 
turn, leading into development of propositions about military learning. 
Defining Learning 
Some scholars emphasize change in behavior as an indicator of learning (Huber, 
1991). However, since it may also be possible to change behavior in response to 
environmental stimuli, without learning, most scholars treat learning as a cognitive 
phenomenon. For other scholars, cognitive change, whether or not manifest in behavior, 
is considered to be sufficient (Friedlander, 1983). Thought and action need not be 
separated. The notion of gaining "insight" from experience is used by Shaw and Perkins 
to describe a cognitive process that is then put into action when the organization modifies 
"the way it functions" according to that insight (1992:175).  
It is understandable for research on organizations to focus on cognition, having to 
do with the manipulation of information, since information is so vital in organizations. As 
theories of organizational design portray it, information processing is a core task of 
organizational structure itself (Nadler, 1992:5). Moving information through the 
organization to coordinate work is fundamental to organizational life. 
Organizations, because they are composed of many individua ls, require 
mechanisms for transmitting meaning, interpreting and distributing it. Social 
communication is vital, according to March (1991), for the development of ground truths 
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and consensus on meaning. Information storage, retrieval, transmission, interpretation 
and application are necessary to getting that consensus on meaning. 
Memory, storage of information in the mind or in an "artificial form" such as a 
file or record, is a basic ingredient in human, and administrative rationality (Simon, 
1945). March and Simon (1958: 10-11) privileged memory in their early definition of 
learning as "changes in the memory content" (10-11). It would be difficult to conceive of 
learning without the ability to hold onto lessons or without a system that triggers retrieval 
of particular information. 
Critical Incidents 
The discussion so far suggests an important role for history in organizational 
learning. Organizations experience history, draw inferences from that experience and 
encode these inferences into routines to guide behavior. However, as March, Sproull and 
Tamuz observe (1996), history is sometimes stingy with experience. When history 
provides limited experience, organizations strive to experience history more richly. To do 
so requires attending to more aspects of experience, developing more interpretations of it, 
and weighing more preferences for evaluating it. Critical incidents or focusing events are 
of special significance for organizations seeking to learn from limited experience.  
What makes an event a critical incident? March et al (1996) identifies three 
characteristics: it is a turning point in history, it changes beliefs about the world, and it 
has metaphorical power. The attacks of September 11 seem to fit. For most Americans 
the world before September 11 was very different from the world after. These attacks 
changed American beliefs about their security, in particular the vulnerability of American 
civilians and the place of America in the world. And the metaphorical power of the 
 9
attacks is undeniable: the visual symbolism is there in the damaged Pentagon and the 
collapsed towers of American industry; the allegorical symbolism is there in the attack on 
America with the aid of America's own infrastructures.  
However, a turning point in history, like the invention of the printing press (cited 
by March et al.) or perhaps the cellular phone or the Internet, creates anticipation of the 
future. Learning for March et al. (1996; p. 4) would focus on "changed implications for 
the future rather than about how to predict or control similar occurrences in the future" 
(emphasis added). US preoccupation with intelligence failures, border security and 
baggage screening is understandable, but indicates a focus a particular type of event.  
Surprising and serious events, the learning and crisis decision-making literatures 
both suggest, can prompt maladaptive responses. Organizations tend to be reluctant to 
question the basis of their problems in general. Considerable effort is involved in 
developing collective interpretations of history. These interpretations are filtered through 
organizational frames or structures of meaning. These are broadly shared, although not 
necessarily universally shared, organizational stories or myths. Learning may occur 
within these frames, but interpretive frameworks are generally resistant to experience. 
In response to surprise, the preferred responses may be chosen on the basis of 
temporal proximity, cognitive availability, and political convenience (Cyert et al., 1958; 
March et al., 1999). Advocates of a particular policy might interpret failure as evidence 
that their policy has not been pursued vigorously enough. Focusing events can drive an 
organizational escalation of commitment to a coarse of action (Ross and Staw, 1986).  
The US Immigration and Naturalization Service appears to be more vigorously 
implementing its policies since it has been criticized for issuing immigration visas to the 
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9/11 hijackers six months after the attack (Delevett, 2002). A 51- year-old homemaker 
from New Zealand arrived at the airport in Los Angles for a visit with in- laws on July 24 
and was escorted through the airport in handcuffs because several trips previously, in 
1998, she had overstayed her visa for 8 days. She was given no food or drink for the first 
12 of the 36 hours she was held and then deported. 
Differentiating Learning  
In general, as critics have noted, there is a pro- learning bias in the literature, an 
assumption that learning is inherently "good." However, learning might take us from 
good to better, or in the case of the Nazi regime in World War II Germany, from bad to 
evil. Scholarship on learning is in danger of value- laden assumptions and danger of 
outright bias. An author can easily sneak her own preferences into definitions of learning 
outcomes. For example, US General George Joulwan essentially defined US 'success' in 
Rwanda as avoiding the mistakes the US made in Somalia.  
The "lesson" many drew from the failed US peacekeeping mission in Somalia was 
to avoid taking on additional tasks, i.e., "mission creep." Joulwan praised the US military 
performance as "careful not to move beyond its explicit mission” in order to arrest Hutu 
militia and former government leaders (associated with commission of atrocities) in the 
Rwanda refugee camps (Joulwan and Shoemaker, 1998: 19). Another view is possible.  
General William Carter, following his experience in Bosnia, described what he thinks is a 
more appropriate term: "mission evolution."  He insists that it's part of the commander's 
job to assess and adjust efforts according to political conditions (Carter, 2000). Whereas 
Joulwan describes an application of past experience to a new context, Carter describes a 
willingness to reconsider approaches in light of external conditions. 
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It seems clear that there are different 'types' of learning. Scholars have 
differentiated learning according to strategy and scope. March (1991) provides a strategic 
perspective on organizational learning. He distinguishes between learning approaches 
that affect organizational processes. For March, the organization engaged in application-
driven learning picks the low-hanging fruit. It exploits existing competencies, 
technologies and paradigms for more certain improvements in performance. In discovery-
driven learning, the organization explores new alternatives for less-certain gains but with 
potential pay-off of decisive competitive advantage. A merit of this distinction is its 
recognition that some forms of information processing are more taxing than others 
(Suedfeld, 1999). In particular, March's writing recognizes the competitive world many 
organizations inhabit. Some learning processes take more effort and are risky. According 
to this framework, the competitive environment influences the organization risk-taking 
for survival.  The competitive international security environment can take some of the 
credit for highly-developed military mechanisms for learning. 
Argyris focuses on the scope of learning in his framework. "Single-loop" learning 
for Argyris (1983: 116) occurs within a frame of reference "without change in the 
underlying governing policies or values." That is, the organization may seek to improve 
the implementation of policies and goal achievement, without questioning those policies 
or goals.  
"Double-loop" learning as described by Argyris (1983) is deep learning in the 
sense that it involves development of a new frame of reference. In other words, double-
loop learning involves a changing definition about what constitutes improvement. 
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Propositions 
While "single- loop" learning processes should be more common generally, we 
might expect military organizations especially to conform to this pattern. First, the norms 
of civil-military relations decree that military forces are political instruments and the role 
of military leaders is to implement but not to develop or change policy.  Second, military 
organizations tend to be highly routine-oriented, emphasizing incremental improvements 
in those routines over paradigm change. Third, military organizations tend to be highly 
compartmentalized and secretive, making it difficult to see outside the institutional 
parameters of one's own service sub-unit, let alone across military services, into the 
interagency or alliance arena and so on. 
We might also expect that high tempo of military operations works against 
systemic learning. First, military personnel in operations are very much 'on the go,' and 
have little time to indulge in resource intensive learning. Information technology 
potentially mitigates the problem of access to information. However, information 
technology adds to the complexity of military operations (see Demchak, 1991). 
Information overload may create pressure to focus on immediately available data. 
Second, high tempo personnel changes make it difficult to exploit individual knowledge 
for the benefit of the organization. 
In addition to these general factors, there is the yet-to-be-determined effect of a 
critical event. On the one hand, organizational learning theory cautions us that a critical 
incident can drive an organization deepening of commitment to a course of action. On the 
other hand, a critical incident might be just the trigger to challenge organizational 
assumptions, even fundamental assumptions about strategy. These may include the 
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organizational frames or the system of symbols that makes up the strategic culture. As 
Johnston describes them, these include assumptions about "the orderliness of the strategic 
environment, that is, about the role of war in human affairs…the nature of the adversary 
and the threat it poses…and about the efficacy of the use of force…" (Johnston, p. 46). 
The relevance of these propositions depends upon specific features of the military 
as an organization. The next section takes on the challenge of studying the military as a 
subject and describes key organiza tional features of the US military. Finally, it is 
important when measuring to appreciate the current position in light of a previous one. 
For this reason, the following discussion also takes stock of learning prior to September 
11, that is, mechanisms tha t may or may not set conditions for the US military to learn 
effectively about the security environment. 
The Military as a Learning Organization 
The US military is obviously relevant in a war on terror and is in general an 
obvious responder when national security is attacked or threatened. Military learning in 
relation to 9/11 thus seems especially significant. Unfortunately, 'the military' as a subject 
of learning presents some methodological problems. On the one hand, 'the military' as a 
subject is too narrow, given the complex of organizational interaction within national 
security structures that include civilian elements in the Department of Defense, the 
command authority of the US President, and the operations of other structures such as the 
National Security Council.  Even more generally, some refer to "the state" and constraints 
on its rational behavior due to national style of strategy or strategic culture (for example, 
Gray, 1981; Johnston, 1995).  
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On the other hand, this generalization is too broad given the strength of 
organizations within the military. The need for internal coherence and cooperation is 
quite high within each service. The incentive structure for military personnel in terms of 
their careers is tied to their services. Joint operations, in which elements from different 
services conduct operations together, is more like multi-organizational action. 2 In sum, 
multiple organizations are simultaneously involved in an ecology of conflict and 
cooperation (Jones, 2001).  One solution is to narrow discussion to one of the uniformed 
services, such as the army, or further, to an organization within the army, such as the 
Special Operations Forces or SOF, or even further to a particular entity within the SOF, 
such as the Special Forces (SF) or green berets, but this seems too limiting.  
The US military is aptly described as a complex system in which elements are 
highly interactive. Axelrod and Cohen (1999) cite officers in military services as 
examples of "populations of agents" in a "complex adaptive system." In such a system, 
current events are particularly influential with regard to possible futures. Strategies are 
the ways participants in the system (called agents) respond to their environment and 
pursue goals.  Selection, the process of strategy change, can be brought about by 
mechanisms we associate with learning, using trial-and-error, or finding a model of 
success to imitate.  However, selection can also come about when the population of 
agents changes. Interaction of the parts with the whole is thus significant, as moving the 
population elements is one way to spread and change strategies.  
                                                 
2 Even at the highest level, service identities have been influential. The Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), until 1986 only advised the president as to the views of the Chiefs of Staff. 
Congressional legislation in the form of the Goldwater-Nichols Act gave the CJCS the role of providing 
independent advice. The most significant organizational struggle of this generation of American military 
officers has been to develop "jointness," interoperability and cooperation among the various services. 
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For the purposes of analysis, I am drawing an organizational boundary around 'the 
military' as distinguished from 'the civilian' realm but will focus on elements within the 
military that are most relevant in responding to the events of September 11. The first part 
of this section describes the military as an organization. The second part of this section 
describes established US military learning mechanisms.  
Military Organization 
Organizational analysis seems well suited to the study of militaries in part because 
militaries tend to be so well, as it happens, organized.3 Military organization is a 
collective action, a social activity that empowers by extending "the domain of individual 
rationality" (Arrow, 1974:16). Cooperation and specialization enable the society at large 
to benefit from efficiency gains. Individuals who are members of a military organization 
take part in two sets of specialization that are relevant: a specialization within the larger 
society and another specialization within the military sphere. 
First, these individuals have accepted a particular role in a social division of labor 
that distinguishes them from civilians and establishes distance between them and "the 
other" realm, that is, the civilian realm. The Army's primary doctrine, expressed as the 
field manual 3-0 Operations explicitly refers to a contractual relationship, calling the 
Army's service "the Army's non-negotiable contract with the American people and its 
enduring obligation to the nation." (Headquarters, Department of the Army, June 2001: 1-
2). 
                                                 
3 Parts of this discussion are drawn from my earlier work on organizational learning and the 
military presented to a panel "Taking Stock of Organizational Learning in Political Science," at the Annual 
Meeting of the American Po litical Science Association, San Francisco, 2001. 
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The collective action solution, to form a special organization for national defense, 
leads to some cultural differentiation in society between civil and military spheres. Non-
governmental organizations working with the military points were advised to pay 
attention to the organizational basis of cultural differentiation between military personnel 
and civilians:  
Certainly there is a distance, if not a divide, between military personnel 
and civilians in terms of how they view their jobs. In part, this distinctive 
outlook is a reflection of the special nature of the military as an institution 
-- a reflection, that is, of the specific tasks it is expected to accomplish and 
the manner in which it organizes to accomplish them. In part, it reflects a 
deeper-seated set of convictions about how the world works, and a set of 
core values about how people ought to behave. (Miltenberger, 2000:207). 
Second, military activity is a social activity in an internal sense, that a high degree 
of cooperation is required among members of the armed forces in order to perform their 
roles. Thus, many characteristics that distinguish military personnel, such as our 
examples of base housing and uniforms, serve internal functional purposes.  
The United States military is a long-standing, highly articulated institutional 
structure with components that possess their own rituals and traditions. Military 
organization is also very hierarchical. Lines of authority are defined between civilian and 
military administrative units and within military organization. Civilian control of military 
forces is established at the apex of US administrative structure, with the president as the 
commander in chief of the military. The National Command Authority includes the 
president and the civilian secretary of defense, and these are assisted by the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), the Joint Staff, and the National Security Council 
(NSC). Control over the military flows in two branches flowing from the secretary of 
defense, as depicted in Figure 1, below. 
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(Figure 1 Goes Here)  
 Administrative and financial control over military forces is exercised by the 
secretaries of the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.4 Administrative control 
(ADCON) includes the ability to form, equip and train units. Operational control 
branches from the secretary of defense through the unified commanders of geographic 
commands (US Central Command, US European Command, US Pacific Command, US 
Southern Command) and functional commands (for example, US Special Operations 
Command and US Space Command). Each of these is led by a top military officer, 
General or Admiral, identified as a Commander in Chief (CINC) of that command (for 
example, CINCPAC, Commander in Chief, Pacific Forces).  
Remembering their position on the operational, as opposed to administrative 
branch of authority, combatant commanders are notably the "warfighting" or "theater" 
commanders during a conflict, (Central Command's General Norman Schwartzkopf 
during the Persian Gulf War, for example). Service components are assigned to the 
CINCs. Combatant commanders exercise combatant command authority (COCOM) over 
their assigned forces, including the authority to organize them, give them specific tasks, 
and also to conduct joint training in preparation for missions. A Joint Task Force (JTF) 
gives the CINC the option of a flexible organizational structure to pull together a 
combination of forces from the different services for a specific purpose or mission. The 
                                                 
4 The Department of the Navy takes responsibility for the Marine Corps, and these two tend to 
operate together closely. 
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Joint Task force is led by a Joint Task Force Commander (JFC) who reports to the 
CINC.5 
The nature of military operations is such that many jobs situate troops in a theater, 
making for a system of troop rotation. This creates a high turnover in personnel even in 
the midst of an operation. In order to mitigate this problem, the parts are designed to be 
as interchangeable as possible. There is also, as discussed in more depth below, an 
organizational system to record experience for the next or future rotation. The 
coordination works upon an elaborate system of service specialization. Emphasis on 
specialization creates incentive structures. Promotions depend upon "punching tickets," 
for example, command experience as a prerequisite to promotion. The promotion paths 
through combat arms makes some service specialties, like Army Civil Affairs, less 
attractive to ambitious officers.  
The organizational structure of the United States military sets the military apart 
from the civilian realm, so that civilian generalizations about the military, and military 
generalizations about civilians, are understandable. However, there are important 
distinctions within the military, between and within the services, for example, that make 
for micro-cultures and specific patterns of interaction and communication.  
The Army offers a good example. The primary purpose of the US Army is "to 
fight and win the nation's wars" (United States Army, 2001:1-2). Combat operations, the 
                                                 
5 Military hierarchy puts more responsibility on high ranking officers. The numbers of personnel 
become quite large at the higher levels of organization. An Army or Marine Corps squad commanded by a 
staff sergeant or sergeant might be composed of a dozen personnel; a number of squads together form a 
platoon commanded by a lieutenant or platoon sergeant; three to five platoons make up a company of 100-
300 commanded by a captain or first sergeant; companies form battalions of 250-750 personnel 
commanded by a lieutenant colonel; a number of battalions make up a brigade or regiment of 750-4000 
commanded by a colonel; a division, commanded by a major general will include more than 17,000 and an 
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primary concern in military training, require a military to confront armed adversaries in 
order to defend or conquer territory. Civil-military operations, in which military 
personnel confront needy civilian populations and seemingly alien species of inter-
governmental, non-governmental and other stakeholders in order to advance a peace 
process seems different and perhaps less straightforward (Guttieri & Suedfeld, 1998). 
The Army's sense of itself does not include nostalgic memories of peacekeeping. 
However, there is growing recognition that in order to "shape" the current strategic 
environment, the military must bear a burden. This recognition is in part simply the 
product of repeated experience. 
The bottom line is that the US has to do peace operations and we need to 
shape the environment. But we do so with mixed feelings. In the military, 
we don’t want to do so without maintaining fundamental military 
competencies. (General Wesley Clark, US Army Peacekeeping Institute, 
1997). 
The US military stands apart from many others because it has specialized civil 
affairs to deal with the civilian realm. 6  In US military doctrine, civil affairs and civil-
military operations encompass interaction between military forces, civilian authorities 
and the civilian population in an area of operations. In its earliest days (i.e. George 
Washington at Valley Forge), civil affairs involved obtaining civilian supplies, labor, 
information and loyalty (Guttieri, 1999). Since World War II and formalized structures 
                                                                                                                                                 
Army corps commanded by a lieutenant general involves authority over more than 50,000 troops. All this is 
to illustrate the scale of military organization, leading to some peculiar characteristics. 
6 Civil affairs are a command responsibility for all US services, but the bulk of civil-military 
operations responsibilities fall to the land force, the US Army, and to the US Marine Corps. US Army civil 
affairs assets today include those not trained primarily for CMO (including for example, military police, 
medical personnel and combat engineers) and specialized active and reserve civil affairs personnel. The 
Army holds 95% of its dedicated Civil Affairs (CA) assets in the reserves. The Army’s one active duty 
Civil Affairs (CA) battalion (the 96th CA Bn) is comprised of fewer than 300 specialists with skills in 
languages, population and resource control and so on. Many of the skills necessary to civil-military 
 20
and schools of military government, Civil Affairs (CA) personnel have been dedicated to 
the specialized role of liaison between the military and the civilian realm.  
Military Learning Systems 
The United States military has proven that, although a ponderous machine, it can 
shift course when circumstances appear to warrant it.7 Experience is powerful teacher, 
but it can be a deadly one for military organizations. For this reason, other methods of 
knowledge acquisition make more sense. These include searching, vicarious learning, and 
grafting. All of these have been exploited to the full by the US military as part of a 
training revolution that includes incentives for professional military education as well as 
training, and training and simulation exercises. All of these play a role in the 
development of doctrine. The United States Army has a long tradition of written doctrine, 
in contrast to the British, for example. Recently the US military has placed more 
emphasis on development of joint doctrine, and today there is a flurry of doctrine writing 
at the multilateral level.  
Doctrine in the American Army is best described by its old French origins, "what 
is taught." The latest Army Operations describes its organizational role: 
                                                                                                                                                 
operations are better and less expensively held in the reserve component. Kenneth H. Pritchard, “The Army 
and Civil-Military Operations in the 21st Century,” Army Times December 1997, pp. 6-9. 
7 The story of a "doctrinal renaissance" in the Army in the 1970s is exemplary (US Army 
Combined Arms Center, 1995; Romjue, 1984). An Army demoralized in the wake of Vietnam confronted a 
difficult reality in Europe, that it would have to "fight outnumbered and win." The "active defense" doctrine 
was developed and put into the 1976 edition of FM 100-5, Operations as a reformed battle doctrine 
emphasizing reactive mobile armored warfare. General Donn A. Starry took over the US Army Training 
and Doctrine Command in 1977 and pushed thinking toward warfare of the future. The new Battlefield 
Development Plan conceded initiative to the Soviet but looked beyond the first echelon into the follow-on 
forces attack. Integration of elements on the battlefield in doctrine that would become known as "AirLand 
Battle" (FM 100-5, 1982) set the stage for the system-of-systems warfare that now gives the US a 
technological edge. This doctrine also created requirements for intensive joint training and a training 
revolution in the military forces generally (Chapman, 1992).   
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Doctrine touches all aspects of the Army. It facilitates communication 
among soldiers no matter where they serve, contributes to a shared 
professional culture, and serves as the basis for curricula in the Army 
Education System. Army doctrine provides a common language and a 
common understanding of how Army forces conduct operations. (FM 3-0: 
2001:1-14)  
In the language of organization theory, doctrine articulates institutional frames 
and the relationships between important constructs like combatant command authority 
and operational control. The story of doctrine development is not, as one might assume in 
such a hierarchical organization, a story of top-down decree of mission. Instead, doctrine 
writing tends to be done at field-grade officer level, with repeated iterations of drafting, 
input and revision before publication.  
Doctrine is anchored in a military learning system that is made of four basic 
elements: schools, exercises, doctrine and field experience. Schools, such as the Joint 
Special Operations University, are dedicated to education, development of ideas, and/or 
training. After Action Reviews are a mechanism to move knowledge from both exercises 
and field experience to the schoolhouses and the field. The precursor to the AAR was the 
combat interview (Morrison & Meliza, 1999). Just as field manuals contain vignettes of 
'lessons learned,' there is AAR reporting doctrine: Joint After-Action Reporting System 
(Joint Pub 1-03.30, April 1991). 
US military organizations self-consciously endeavor to adapt. The United States 
Army for example, beginning in the 1970s, began an extensive program of training 
exercises and operational post-mortems, or After Action Reviews (AAR). Peter Senge, 
widely associated with the concept of a "learning organization," declares,  
The Army's After Action Review (AAR) is arguably one of the most 
successful organizational learning methods yet devised.(Senge, 2001) 
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On the other hand, more than one AAR participant has reported "We don't learn 
or read previous 'lessons learned.'" (USEUCOM, 1994: Appendix A, 8-3). A new book 
on the AAR describes the US Army as creating a culture of learning (Darling & Parry, 
2001), even as others claim that its strong organizational culture and ironically, its system 
of written doctrine, have made the US Army less capable than the British in 
counterinsurgency, low-intensity and peace operations (Nagl, 1999:161). 
In order to capture lessons from field experience, the Army Center for Lessons 
Learned (CALL) normally sends a team on each operation to document events and make 
suggestions for improvement (Hardesty and Ellis, 1997). A CALL team does the 
collection, following social scientific methodology, but others, including outside subject 
matter experts provide the analysis. Thus there is some form of grafting in as the military 
solicits outside analysis. This is but one database of lessons learned in the United States 
or among allies and international organizations, and there is danger in assuming that the 
process of AAR and lessons learned is more organized than it is. More importantly, one 
must consider the role of frames that filter the lessons in this process.  
The literature on organizational learning emphasizes that "information acquisition 
depends in many instances on attention, which is directed by previous learning retained in 
memory" (Huber, 1996:150). In the CALL process, senior managers direct the 
questioning (Thomas et al., 2001). CALL has no ability to enforce implementation of a 
recommendation so only lessons that present "strategic opportunity" are sought.  
The use of "current frames of senior managers to allocate [learning] resources" 
(Thomas et al, 2001) has costs as well as benefits in terms of the freedom of the system to 
exploit serendipitous learning. The wash of After Action Reviews commissioned 
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elsewhere in the military organization also can generate "vanilla" evaluations. The second 
of two commissioned Bosnia-Herzegovina After Action Reviews (BHAAR II) did not 
survive the wash. It was published separately in Parameters, the US Army War College 
Quarterly (Manwaring, 1998). The open "learning culture" so lauded by learning 
organization gurus is not as impressive as it seems. Likewise, civilians have expressed a 
sense that the military in not incorporating the lessons of exercises. A former director of 
the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance had this comment: 
…there have been a great many military exercises -- a lot of which I 
attended, and a lot I have heard of -- but I am not sure that as a result of 
these exercises there is real transferability of information… I don't know if 
that is built into the system. I know within the various [military and 
civilian] communities there is a lot of rotation of people. That is 
inevitable. But, how do we get around the recognition of the fact of 
rotation and make what you all spend your time learning something that 
really gets transferred? (NDU Symposium, 1999) 
The US military operates a dynamic organizational learning system, but a system 
that requires triggers to stimulate the feed forward and feedback learning loops. Military 
commanders commonly draw upon analogies during operations, but we do not 
understand well what triggers one analogy as opposed to another. For Major General 
Thomas Montgomery, the operational environment in Somalia triggered memories of his 
early military experience, saying, "when I closed my eyes, it seemed I was back in 
Vietnam." That he had for most of the interim career served in Europe, with little 
expectation to ever again conduct the kind of civil-military operations typical in Vietnam, 
made this recollection particularly noteworthy (Montgomery, 2001). With the passage of 
time, there is likely to be less ease of triggering knowledge, unless there is an 
environmental anomaly that attracts attention.  
 24
September 11 and America's Security Paradigm 
"Never did we imagine what would take place on Sept. 11, where people 
used those airplanes as missiles and as weapons." -- Ari Fleisher (in 
Zakaria, 2002) 
It is not wholly true that no one imagined what would take place on September 
11, but it is clear that the airplanes that hit the Pentagon and World Trade Center on 
September 11, 2001 struck with devastating and surprising effect. The attack ground to a 
halt activity at major centers of national commerce and transportation, notes Peter Chalk 
(2001) "shattering an image of American invincibility both at home and abroad." 
America's self- image has been shaped in part by geopolitics. Bradley Klein (1988) has 
described the American strategic culture as a "power projection" culture that emphasizes 
delivery of tremendous destructive power across great distances. Having the luxury of 
two oceans and over a century of friendly borders, American strategic culture is suited to 
a great power that prefers to take its battles to the enemy.  It is also very insular. There 
has been surprisingly little discussion of the applicable lessons from the experiences of 
other military forces with longer histories responding to terrorism (notable exceptions 
include Sarafino, 2002). For the most part, American analysts have searched America’s 
own experiences for lessons. 
The United States had been struck by terrorists in the past, (indeed the World 
Trade Center had been struck in the last decade), but this attack was different.8  The scale 
of the devastation was a surprise even to its perpetrators. It was a high-consequence 
event.  
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One might note, however, that its likelihood of terrorist success diminished within 
an hour -- the time it took to communicate to passengers on United Airlines Flight 93 that 
their hostage scenario was not going to end up in negotiations on a tarmac in Cuba. 
Civilian and military response to the immediate crisis was swift. Within fifteen minutes 
of the first attack at 8:46 a.m., when American Airlines Flight 11 hit the north tower of 
the World Trade Center, the national aviation system stopped all departing planes and 
then at 9:45 the Federal Aviation Administration ordered all planes to land -- an 
estimated 4,452 at 9:25 that morning -- as soon as possible (Levin et al., 2002). On 
September 11, there were 14 US military fighter aircraft ready to take off on 10 minutes' 
notice. By October there were 100. In addition, military fighters, such as F-15s armed 
with Sidewinder and AMRAAM air-to-air missiles, began regular combat patrols over 
American cities (Stern, 2001), prepared to shoot down airliners on notice. The National 
Guard deployed more than 7,000 members to secure airports (Office of Homeland 
Security, 2002).  
On September 27, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld argued that the US was 
engaged in “a new kind of war” (Rumsfeld, September 27, 2001). Rumsfeld depicted 
military force as “one of the many tools we use,” citing “electronic combat” as another 
tool. Rumsfeld’s speech broke from traditional concepts of the enemy to embrace “a 
global network.” It was a wide sweeping statement, declaring that “even the vocabulary 
of this war will be different.” 
                                                                                                                                                 
8 Previous attacks on the US include a 1983 suicide-bombing of US Marine barracks in Beirut, 
Lebanon, 1998 attacks against US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and the attack on the USS Cole in 
Yemen Oct. 12, 2000. 
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This section of the paper focuses on US military operations since September 11, 
including Operation Noble Eagle, guarding the homeland, and Operation Enduring 
Freedom in Afghanistan. In addition to operations in Afghanistan, there is the camp at 
Guantanamo, Cuba that holds detainees from the counter-terrorist operations, and 
military operations in the Philippines and Georgia. To borrow a sports metaphor, these 
are the home and away games.  These fronts in the war on terrorism are also 
predominantly stability operations. The home game is more challenging because US 
military experience at home has been of two general varieties: sporadic or distant. The 
US military has responded from time to time in the event of natural disasters, civil 
disturbances and labor riots. More sustained engagements in the post-Civil War era are a 
distant memory. The away game has a more extensive set of experiences to draw upon, 
given US military participation in peacekeeping and counterinsurgency efforts since 
World War II.  
The Home Game 
Almost immediately September 11 introduced a clever reframing of the problem, 
modifying the military expression "homeland defense" to the more proactive sounding 
"homeland security." Institution building characterizes the response from the Bush 
Administration and the US military. The proposed Department of Homeland Security 
creates a new institutional configuration of federal civilian agencies. For its part, the 
Department of Defense established Northern Command to integrate its operation in the 
domestic theater. Military responders in previous internal operations such as the riots and 
disaster relief have come to appreciate that civilian agencies have the lead, but do not 
exercise command and control as they know it.  
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The proposed Homeland Security Department pulls together federal agencies that 
the military must engage on issues of border security, terrorism prevention, protection of 
critical infrastructure, and consequence management. Military officers are likely to 
welcome the creation of a Department of Homeland Security, given past frustrations 
dealing with comparatively "disorganized" civilian agencies. However, this mechanism 
does not remove the continuing need for collaboration and information sharing across 
numerous jurisdictions. The Department does not include state and local agencies, or the 
private sector that owns much of America's critical infrastructure.  
The US government had made a number of attempts to organize a response to the 
threat of terrorism at least since the Nixon Administration (see Menarchik, 2001).  After 
the February 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, there was less complacency 
about the potential for terrorism in the US but countermeasures were problematic. There 
were problems in determining what was to be protected and at what cost, and who was to 
be the lead. Even the Bush team, in May 2001, created an Office of National 
Preparedness, and promised (but did not deliver) a Dick Cheney- led government review 
into the consequences of a domestic attack (Calabrese et al., 2002).  
Nonetheless, policy makers, military officers, intelligence analysts were not blind 
to the problems of communication and coordination should a domestic incident occur. 
Top Off in 2000 was a Congressionally funded effort to bring together top officials 
including federal, state and local responders to exercise together a response to an event. 
Top Off, like much of the US counter terrorism efforts, focused on the high-threat, low-
probability scenario of a weapon of mass destruction. As Peter Chalk observes, the focus 
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on "high consequence events" ignored the terrorists proven preference for conventional 
weapons: 
[The events on Sept. 11] exposed gaps in current US terrorist threat and 
consequence management, much of which has stemmed from the 
misguided assumption that rudimentary conventional attacks represent a 
lesser contingency that can be easily dealt with in preparations for high-
end WMD assaults. 
The Bush Administration has yet to produce a national security strategy but 
produced its National Strategy for Homeland Security in July 2002. One of the federal 
initiatives it promotes is to review the authority for military assistance in domestic 
security, prompting Congressional debate on altering roles and missions for the armed 
forces (Mitchell, 2002). The debate has centered on the National Guard, considered part 
of the military reserves and funded by the federal government. However, except in 
circumstances such as the Los Angeles riots in 1992 when they are federalized, the Guard 
belong to state governors. Although the National Guard currently participate in foreign 
operations, for example, in the NATO Stabilization Force peacekeeping mission in 
Bosnia, there has been discussion since September 11 about dedicating the National 
Guard solely to domestic operations.  
The establishment of a Homeland Security Department will constitute some of the 
most significant changes in the US national security organization since the Truman 
Administration. Initially, Bush sought simply to create a White House office, headed by 
Tom Ridge, to deal with domestic security. However, critics charged that the office was 
toothless, without oversight and budget authority. Meanwhile, the FBI and the Central 
Intelligence Agency came under increasing scrutiny. In June of this year, Bush asked 
Congress to approve a new cabinet department to coordinate intelligence and to 
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consolidate American responses to terrorist attack. As proposed, Homeland Security 
would merge 22 federal agencies, including the US Coast Guard, Secret Service, 
Immigration and Naturalization Service, Border Patrol, Transportation Security and the 
Customs Service (Hsu, 2002; Council on Foreign Relations, 2002). Critics of the 
proposal argue that reorganization is not enough when "the problems are information 
flow and collaboration" (Hsu, 2002)  
The reorganization signifies a consolidation of power in the executive. In 
addition, it involves an opportunistic move to break civil-service unions of those falling 
into the reorganization. Also of interest in the expansion of executive power is the 
Rumsfeld Pentagon directive that “CINC” titles be removed from the Unified Command 
Plan and that in place of “National Command Authorities,” reference ought to be made 
separately to the President or the Secretary of Defense (Barrows, 2002). 
The liberal democratic norm is to disperse power in order to prevent abuse. The 
Allies compelled Germany and Japan to decentralize their defense and intelligence 
systems after World War II for that reason. Centralization of Homeland Security 
mechanisms is not typical liberal democratic practice but it is a typical pattern of liberal 
democratic response to trauma.  
Laura Donohue observes that the US had "an extensive array of counterterrorism 
measures" prior to September 11, including legislation enacted after home-grown villains 
bombed the federal building in Oklahoma City (Alexander, 2001). The dilemma for 
liberal democratic states, argues Donohue, is that extant measures are not enough, and 
government response is not enough: the government must "be seen to be responding." 
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The visible Pentagon response included a proposal in February to create its own 
structure, namely a new office, to open October 1, 2002, called Northern Command 
(Northcom). The New York Times proclaimed, "a new theater of operations is defined as 
within the nation's borders" (Dao, Feb. 6, 2002).  Northcom represents a geographic 
unified command, and thereby unified command structure, for military operations at 
home.  This is not the first unified command plan shift, but some features of the new 
command are particularly noteworthy. 
Northcom elements based in Colorado Springs will assume control of the air 
defense arrangement with Canada, North American Aerospace Defense Command 
(NORAD) and take charge of military air and coastal patrols for homeland defense. The 
component responsible for military assistance to civil authorities responding to terrorist 
attacks or natural disasters will reside with the Joint Forces Headquarters Homeland 
Security (JFHQ) in Norfolk, VA. Air Force General Ralph Eberhart will have the 
authority to organize, train and operate units, or 'combatant command' authority, over a 
number of specialized units, including the Joint Task Force Civil Support trained for 
response to chemical, biological or nuclear weapons attacks, and JTF-6, DoD's 
counterdrug support unit established in 1989 (Garamone, 2002).  In sum, the new 
structure is really a superstructure that consumes pre-existing initiatives, such as the JTF-
Civil Support established by Joint Forces Command. 
According to Eric Schmitt, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard Myers "have said that in a catastrophe, the 
military might help quarantine disaster victims and deal with the water and sanitation 
needs of thousands of people" (Schmitt, 2002). Such large-scale military operations will 
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require adjustment by the military. To provide one micro- illustration, "cover me" in 
police parlance means "have your weapon ready"; in US Marine Corps parlance it means 
something else. In Los Angeles in 1992 when police requested US marines to "cover" 
their response to a domestic dispute, marines fired hundreds of bullets into a house where 
there were children (Delk, 1995: 221-2). For this reason, legitimate civilian police are 
preferred responders to domestic disturbances (Rasmussen). Are Americans prepared for 
more wide-ranging internal roles for its military?   
The internal use of military forces is unpleasant for a nation that from its 
inception feared standing armies. This cultural schism is prominent in current debate 
about widening the role of the military and revising the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act. 
The Posse Comitatus Act, expressed in Title 18, US Code, Section 1385, prohib its 
"except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act 
of Congress" the willful use of "any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse 
comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws…" As John Brinkerhoff explains it (2002) the 
Act responded to a post-Civil War power struggle between Congress and US marshals in 
the South who were pressing Army troops into their service. The Act intended to keep 
primary the duty of soldiers to a permanent military body. Many have since 
oversimplified the meaning of Posse Comitatus as prohibiting the use of active military 
forces in domestic law enforcement altogether.  
The US military has a more extensive internal experience than many might think. 
According to David Adams (1995), between 1866 and 1990 the US military averaged 18 
interventions per year.  The average number of troops involved averaged 12,000. These 
figures do not include disaster relief, but they do include internal war against Native 
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American societies, suppression of labor movements in 'strike wars,' control of urban 
riots and anti-war demonstrations, as well as civil rights enforcement, quelling prison 
disturbances, and so on.  
The legal tests to determine the use of military regulatory, proscriptive or 
compulsory power over civilians provide permission for passive and indirect assistance to 
law enforcement, such as advising law enforcement on a suspect's location, furnishing 
equipment and services. (Grove, 1999).  Paradoxically, given the origins of the Act, 
permissions apply when the military is not in charge, i.e., when the law enforcement 
agency such as the FBI originates and remains in control of operations.   
In sum, previous US military engagements at home have been ad hoc 
deployments in support of civil authority. The creation and configuration of Northcom 
suggests both renewed recognition of the domestic theater of operations and a concerted 
effort to manage operations in that theater. 
The Away Game 
"Is there another place on the planet where we could drop in a few 
hundred special ops guys and topple a government?" -- unnamed US 
general (in Moran, 2002) 
In early January of 2001, Richard Clarke, chair of the interagency 
Counterterrorism Strategy Group (CSG) presented a plan to take on al-Qaeda to the 
incoming Bush team (Calabresi, et al., 2002).  He had been working on counterterrorism 
plan since the October 2000 bombing of the US Cole in Yemen. The proposals 
languished for many reasons, including perhaps the Bush team's reluctance to take on a 
plan developed under Clinton, and the CIA and Pentagon's reluctance to take on a plan 
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developed in the White House. The reasons almost certainly included the Bush team's 
preoccupation with other issues, such as missile defense, relations with Russia and China.  
Clarke's plan called for freezing financial assets of the al-Qaeda network; support 
to nations such as Uzbekistan, the Philippines and Yemen against terrorism; support to 
Afghan elements taking on the Taliban regime (this would also engage graduates of 
terrorism training camps on the front lines alongside their host regime); US military air 
strikes against al-Qaeda training camps; and introduction of special operations forces. 
These proposals, according to a senior Bush Administration official, amount to 
"everything we've done since 9/11" (Calabrese, et al., p. 31).  America's thirst for 
vengeance after the attacks put American troops into Afghanistan and elsewhere in a 
global war on terror. There is much about this front that is noteworthy. 
George W. Bush in his campaign for the presidency in 2000 belittled the Clinton 
Administration's use of military forces in "nation-building," and Al Gore's proposed 
"Marshall Plan" for the Balkans. Bush's position during the presidential debates likely 
echoed the general sentiment of US military officers: 
Mr. Bush – “…I don’t think our troops ought to be used for what’s called 
nation building. I think our troops ought to be used to fight and win war.” 
Mr. Gore – “…This idea of nation-building is kind of a pejorative phrase, 
but think about …World War II.  
…[I] in the aftermath of our great victory in World War II, we laid down 
the Marshall Plan, President Truman did: we got intimately involved in 
building NATO and other structures there…And what did we do in the 
40’s and 50’s and 60’s? We were nation-building. And it was economic. 
But it was also military.” (“The 2000 Campaign”) 
On April 17 2002 in Lexington Virginia, President Bush called for a Marshall 
Plan for Afghanistan (Bush, April 18, 2002; Dao, April 18, 2002).  The President told 
cadets at the Virginia Military Institute that "true peace" would not be achieved without 
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reconstruction support to Afghanistan. Warfighting commander General Tommy Franks, 
although complaining that he would be quoted as discussing nation-building (Rumsfeld, 
Aug. 15, 2002),  said recently that the US was committed to as much: "The real problem, 
in my view, in Afghanistan is not security. It is rather the challenge of bolstering the new 
government." Franks admitted that US troops would be in Afghanistan for years (Burns, 
August 16, 2002).  As of August 2002, there were about 8,000 US members of an 
international coalition in Afghanistan, hunting al-Qaeda, training an Afghan national 
army, and providing civil services.  Not surprisingly, the US has sought to lean upon 
allies, namely the International Security Assistance Force. By March of 2002 more than 
half the foreign forces in Afghanistan were non-US (Bush, March 11, 2002).  Few foreign 
troops of any sort were found outside of Kabul. 
Operation Enduring Freedom includes a number of organizational surprises, like 
the decision to give the Marine Corps the role of securing an airbase south of Kandahar, 
"a beachhead a thousand miles from the beach," as an officer described it (Moran, 2002).  
The USMC typically "kicks open the door" for the regular Army, as the latter has a better 
tail to teeth ratio for sustained missions. More significant yet is the prominence of Special 
Operations Forces in the war on terror. 
Special Operations Forces differ from conventional units because they are 
smaller, quickly deployed, self- reliant, and trained with unconventional warfare skills 
(like deception) and area skills including language ability and cultural sensitivity. 
According to a study of United States Special Operations Forces, "counterterrorism and 
unconventional warfare are strictly special operations" (Collins, 1994).  Previously, SOF 
suffered from some neglect in the larger military organizational structure. These forces 
 35
constitute a small percentage of the total US military force. SOF refers to five groups (or 
six, depending upon the status of the supposedly secret Delta Force): Army Rangers, 
Special Forces (Green Berets), Navy SEALs, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations. 
The first three SOF are often regarded as elitist by others in their own services, and the 
last two are considered to be not warfighting enough. Career advancement has not 
matched that of the regular combat arms.  
Congress, observing notable military failures in low intensity conflict operations 
during the Iran hostage rescue attempt and again in Grenada, and frustrated with the 
military services siphoning off special operations funding for conventional forces, 
mandated the creation of the United States Special Operations Command in 1986 (Public 
Law 99-661, Section 1311, "the Cohen-Nunn Amendment").  Congress deemed more 
legislation as necessary to move bureaucratic arrangements forward within the 
Department of Defense for its new Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict unit. A 
snapshot of SOF activities in 1993 identified 151 missions involving 2517 personnel in 
40 countries and 22 states (Collins, 1995: 98-105). A firefight in the fall of 1993 in 
Somalia that killed 18 SOF and wounded 73 precipitated the US withdrawal from 
peacekeeping there. 
Due to the perceived success of the Afghanistan mission, Richard Melanson at the 
National War College says, "Being special is all the rage right now…and you can expect 
every branch to be emphasizing its own 'special' capabilities" (in Moran, 2002). Secretary 
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld seems interested in making the SOF more special yet. 
Rumsfeld wants Special Operations units to expand their involvement in clandestine 
activities that have to date been undertaken by the CIA under Congressional scrutiny 
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(Shanker and Risen, 2002).  The CIA and Special Forces on the ground in Afghanistan 
worked together in a weapons buy-back program to acquire Stinger missiles. In the past, 
troops have been assigned to CIA-led programs. For example, in Vietnam, Green Berets 
and the CIA worked closely on foreign army training and unconventional warfare 
projects.  The Green Beret role in Afghanistan recently expanded to include providing 
personal security for President Hamid Karzai, after the murder of a vice president in 
Kabul July 6, 2002. The move caused some concern that Karzai would "appear even 
more in the American pocket" (Gall, 2002), even though the International Security 
Assistance Force in Kabul announced a program to train bodyguards for cabinet 
ministers, and a Karzai spokesman emphasized that US Special Forces would be working 
with Afghan counterparts.   
One field reporter has characterized Special Operations as "the vanguard of a 
novel Pentagon mission" who demonstrate "how much the US military has learned from 
rocky attempts at keeping the peace in Somalia and the Balkans in the 1990s…how the 
Pentagon…is embracing a more holistic view of what is necessary to declare victory in 
modern war." (Peterson, March 1, 2002).  Another New York Times correspondent writes 
that "Just as the intensive use of Special Forces to turn the tide in Afghanistan is 
rewriting American War-fighting doctrine, so are their current efforts stretching Army 
Special Forces doctrine" (Shanker, January 7, 2002).   
The military reorganization for the fight ought not to be exaggerated. The "high-
tech, out-of-harm's-way strategy" that characterizes America's approach to air campaigns 
ruled the day again in Afghanistan, causing the loss of hundreds of civilian lives (Filkins, 
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July 21, 2002).  Certainly the civilian casualties resulting from the air war ought to have 
been anticipated to undermine any efforts to win hearts and minds.  
If the air war was more of what would have been predicted, there are nonetheless 
signs that Central Command has innovated in the Afghanistan mission. As early as 
October 2001, Centcom invited UN and other civilian groups to headquarters in Tampa 
for consultation. According to the military these meetings did not get far because civilian 
agencies, many of them suspicious of military participation in humanitarian projects, 
requested only military extraction in the event of trouble. Other reports suggest that the 
civilian input was not effectively integrated into the dominant military planning 
structures. However, the effort does suggest that the military has learned about the 
importance of coordination with international agencies and non-governmental 
organizations.  
Surprisingly, US bearded SOF in Afghanistan were seen attired in jeans, boots 
and scarves, pistols beneath their sweatshirts and radio antennae sticking out from their 
backpacks. One official explained that military experience has shown the uniform to be 
"a barrier" to relations with civilian agencies in the Bosnia and Kosovo (Peterson, 2002). 
American soldiers in civilian clothing caused complaint by European agencies and the 
NGO CARE International, who did not want military personnel to be confused with relief 
workers. The Commander of the Coalition Joint Civil Military Operations Task Force 
(Chickmotif) General David Kratzer argued tha t civilian dress is the only way to ensure 
the safety of his troops (Glasser, 2002).  The Chickmotif arrived in at the end of 
December. The “Chicklets” as they are nicknamed, are some of the teams operating 
outside of Kabul, made up of four to six soldiers. Their pattern of operations is familiar in 
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US military doctrine; their size is not dissimilar to the military government teams that 
followed combat forces in the wake of World War II. A frustration expressed by civilian 
relief workers in March was that the military effort includes continuing violence and 
seems to be focused both on the short term and on bolstering the interim government 
(Glasser, 2002). 
The away game is notably not isolated to Afghanistan. The front has opened up: 
the US sent 500 troops to the Philippines, trainers to the Republic of Georgia, and 
provided training and equipment to Yemen to help prevent that nation from becoming "a 
haven for terrorists" (Bush, March 11, 2002).  Likewise, after September 11, the US 
approach to its peacekeeping mission in Bosnia changed. Then Bosnia High 
Representative Wolfgang Petritsch said in late September that after the 9/11 attacks the 
US commanders of the NATO force in Bosnia "started acting like American generals" 
(Kaminski, March 15, 2002).  American troops raided a number of targets, including the 
Saudi High Commission in Sarajevo (where they seized a computer with programs about 
how to fly crop-dusting planes and how to fake US Embassy identification badges). 
Americans picked up six Algerians and transported them to the detention facility, Camp 
X-Ray in Guantanamo Cuba. September 11 has lessons for peacekeeping, according to 
Wall Street Journal correspondent Matthew Kaminski: "the good news is that Bosnia, a 
child of the Clinton era, has now become central to the Bush Doctrine's commitment to 
make sure weak states don't fall into terrorist hands again." (Kaminski, 2002). The US 
quickly led the drive for Bosnians to set up a border security service. 
The new energy in American military operations follows a series of military 
frustrations with peacekeeping missions. From the military perspective, peacekeeping 
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requires dealing with multiple civilian authorities. Civilian direction has been criticized 
for its lack of clarity; or alternatively, for its micromanagement (which implies the 
reverse).  Peacekeeping requires restrictive rules of engagement and an appearance of 
impartiality. Security building in Afghanistan did not come with these restrictions. 
Blatant self- interest is a powerful motivator. Michael Ignatieff declares, “America’s 
entire war on terror is an exercise in imperialism,” asking, “what else can you call 
America’s legions of soldiers, spooks and Special Forces straddling the globe?” 
(Ignatieff, 2002). Although the term has more restrictive definitions, Ignatieff’s use refers 
to a broader definition of imperialism as a “practice by which powerful nations or peoples 
seek to extend and maintain control or influence over weaker nations or peoples” 
(Mastanduno, 2002).  At the same time that the scope of American military intervention 
seems objectionable in Ignatieff’s critique, his greater objection seems to be the lack of 
depth of the nation-building: “…the Bush Administration wants to do this on the cheap, 
at the lowest level of investment and risk. In Washington they call this nation-building 
lite” (Ignatieff, 2002, p. 28).  The US has failed to learn the lesson from the Balkans, he 
argues, that the rule of law must be built in from the beginning, or international aid 
becomes fodder for locals to skim, fueling cycles of corruption and waste. That is, 
supposing that the humanitarian mission in Afghanistan is more than window-dressing on 
America’s effort to rout terrorism suspects.   
In sum, the military has largely used existing assets and methods in its war on 
terror abroad. The use of SOF in Afghanistan is not far removed from anything described 
in Special Operations doctrine (JP 3-05, 1998).  The Chickmotif in Afghanistan is simply 
a new name for an old form of Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) or Civil-
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Military Cooperation (CIMIC) mechanism as established in other stability operations. 
Whether their use is “rewriting war-fighting doctrine” (Shanker, January 7, 2002) is 
another question. The application of extant doctrine is in this case more interesting than 
the writing of new doctrine. 
Conclusion 
The challenge of learning from September 11 seems in part to have been a 
challenge of learning for those events. Based upon my survey, I must conclude that the 
attack on September 11 was a critical incident that triggered efforts within the US 
military to dig into previous experiences for insights relevant to the new war. Despite an 
alleged cultural proclivity toward power projection, the military adjusted its focus to 
consider domestic requirements and sent lighter more specialized forces into key foreign 
operations.  
The past offered a mixed bag of lessons for the war on terror. Internal military 
operations in the past had been sporadic or long ago, and left the US military seeking to 
avoid commitments at home. Peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance operations were 
more recent but also left the military seeking to avoid commitment to stability operations. 
However unpalatable these experiences, they were vital to US military recognition of 
some key civil-military relationships in stability operations at home and abroad, with US 
civilian agencies, intergovernmental, non-governmental, and foreign governmental 
actors.   
The organizational learning literature anticipates that "single- loop" learning 
processes should be more common. A more fundamental change, like reconsideration of 
the efficacy of the use of force, did not seem to make the agenda. The long-term potential 
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of the war against terror was hardly questioned as the US military was deployed to 
retaliate for the September 11 attacks. A reconsideration of “the nature of the adversary 
and the threat it poses” (Johnston, p. 46) seemed at first to be a substantive cultural 
consequence of the attacks, except that the consolidation of power and the hardening of 
infrastructure at home, and the application of force abroad to bolster friendly regimes 
seems such familiar strategy.  
The pattern of military behavior since September 11 in general is better described 
as exploitation of existing competencies rather than exploration for new strategic 
advantages (March, 1991). The US military has appeared to be responding, by creating 
the structure of Northern Command, for example, but whether this action reflects a bold 
step forward in light of a reconstructed sense of purpose in not evident.  
Politics and an external shock seem to have created an opportunity for application 
of streams of thought within the US military about the potential of special operations 
forces. Here the personnel changes within the military, and the emergence of a generation 
that has for the most part experienced stability operations might be part of the 
explanation. The effort to uncover military organizational learning is a good exercise for 
identifying a number of ways in which the military as an organization is a system in 
which parts interact with the whole. In the story of learning and September 11, it is 
difficult to sort out just who did what sort of learning. For some elements, the change was 
simply incremental improvement in established routines. The paradigm change, if there 
was one, was in the activation of those routines.  
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